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I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, international envirorunental cooperation has emerged and 
intensified in many areas in response to new scientific inf ormation and techno-
logical advances in pollution control. While in many cases it has not yet reached 
the level of legally binding conventions, the body of formal international 
environmental law is growing fast, as evidenced by international legislation 
regarding the protection of the Mediterranean 1 and the Baltic, 2 transboundary 
haz.ardous waste, 3 marine pollution from land-based sources, 4 the protection of 
the ozone layer5 and long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe,6 to name 
but a few examples. The legal framework governing these areas of international 
environmental relations often consists of a convention as weil as one or more 
protocols and/or annexes that contain detailed provisions on specific issues. As 
with other multilateral rreaties, most of these instruments have been negotiated 
within existing international organizacions. 
Yet, with their enrry into force, these instroments create their own formally 
independent discussion fora. Contrary to ordinary multilateral treaties, all of 
them provide for the establishment of a confercnce of parties that mcets regu-
larly. These conferences undertake a variety of tasks, induding the adopcion of 
1 fürcdona Convenrion for thc Protccrion of thc Mcditerranean Sea against Pollution (1976), 15 /L'J 290 
(1976); Protocol Concerning Co-operarion in Combatting Pollution of the Mcditerrancan Sea by Oil and 
Othcr Harmful Subsunccs in Cases ofEmcrgcncy (Barcelona 1976), 15 ILM 306 (1976); Protocol for thc 
Prevention of Pollution of thc Mcditcrranean Sca by Dumping &om Ships and Aircraft (Barcelona 1976 ). 
15 ILM 300 (1976); Protocol for the Ptotection of the Mediterranean Sea from Land-bascd Sources (Athens 
1980). 19 ILM 869 {1980). 
' Convenrion on thc Protection of thc Marine Environment of the Balric Sca Area (Helsinki 197 4 ). 1J I IM 
546 (1974). 
' Basel Convenrion on the Control ofTransbound.ary Movemcnts of Ha.zardow Wastes and their Disposal 
(1989), 28 ILM 657 (1989). 
• Convenrion for the Prcvenrion of Marine Pollution &om I..and-Bascd Sources (Paris 1974). 13 JIM 352 
(1974). 
' Vienna Convention for the Protection ofthc Ozonc Layer (1985). 26 ILM 1529 (1987); Montreal Prorocol 
on Substances that Dcpletc the Orone Layer (1987), 26 ILM 1550 (1987). 
• Convcntion on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (Gencva 1979), 18 ILM 1442 (1979); Protocol 10 
the 1979 Convention on I.ong-range Transboundary Air Pollution on thc Reduction of Sulphur Emissions 
or their Transbound.ary Fluxcs by at least 30 per cent (Helsinlci 1985). 27 ILM 699 ( 1988); Protocol to the 
1979 Convenrion on Long-range Transbowxhry Air Pollution Concern.ing the Contra! of Emissions of 
Nitrogen Oxides or their Transboundary Flwccs (Sofia 1988), 28 ILM 214 (1989). 
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protocols7 and annexes,8 the supervision of the implementation of prescriptions9 
and (though rarely in explicit form) the revision of the convention itself. 10 This 
wide competence contrasts with the traditional type of international agreement 
which provides for technical commissions to implement prescriptions while 
retaining the separate mechanism of diplomatic conferences for handling poütical 
matters, e.g., revisions or extensions of the legal framework itself 11 In the 
above-mentioned international environmental conventions, the distinction 
between political and technical issues has virtually disappeared. Given the assort-
ment of tasks, the conferences of contracring parties are at the sarne time technical 
and poütical bodies. 
Frequently, these conferences develop into permanent fora for the negotiation 
and adoption of new instruments of international law12 or, as the case may be, 
for major revisions of existing ones. 13 Due to their poütical character, conferences 
of parties are often held at a high political - occasionally even at a ministerial 14 -
level. 
Regulations developed in these fora, and governing a defined area of inter-
national environrnental relations, shall be labelled international environmental 
1 Stt Vicnna Convcnrion (Articlc 6, paragraph 4 (g) and (h)); Basc:l Convcnrion (A.rticlcs 15 a.nd 17). but cf. 
Barcelona Convcnrion (A.rticlc 16). Significantly, thc Gcncva Convcntion dors not contain any cxplicit 
rulc on futurc protocols or anncxcs. This rdlcctS thc prccarious srarc of conscnsus lt rhc conclusion of rhc 
Convcnrion. Stt E. Choussudovsky. "&t-Wtst" Diplmrt«y for Erwironml!nt in tht Unittd Ndlions. 71tt High-
ln>tl Mttting witlrin tht Frarrttiwrk of ECE on tht Prottctiorr of tht Envitonmntt (1989). /ls a mattcT of principlc, 
thc rcvision of any protocol is thc prcrogativc of thc contracring pan:ics to thc rcspcctivc insnumcnt. In 
thc casc of thc rcgirnc for thc pro1cction of thc ozonc laycr, 1his lcd 10 thc cstablishmcnt of a sccond. vir-
rual.ly indcpcndcnt mccting of 1hc confcrcncc of partics to thc Monrrcal Protocol. 
8 Stt Vicnna Convcntion (Articlc 6. par:agraph 4(g)); Barcelona Convcntion (Articlc 17); P:uis Convcntion 
(A.rticlc 18, paragraph 4) on rcvisions of a submnrial anncx. 
• Stt Vicnna Convcntion (Articlc 6, paragraph 4(a)); Gcncva Convcntion (Articlc 10); &sei Convcnnon 
(A.rticlc 15, paragraph 5); Paris Convcntion (Articlc 16, paragraph !); Barcelona Convcntion (A.rticlc 14, 
paragraph 2). 
1° Cf provisions of thc Gcncva Convcntion (Articlc 10) with 1hosc of thc Vicnna Convcntion (Articlc 6, 
paragraph 4(c) and thc Basel Convcnrion (Articlc 15, paragraph S{b) and A.rriclc 17, paragraph 2). 
11 During ncgoriarions on thc Convcntion for thc Protcction of thc Ozonc Laycr, discussion arosc on thc 
approptia1cncss of confcrring thc right 10 prcparc revisions of thc Convcnrion 10 thc confcrcncc of 
pan:ics. Stt UNEIYWG. 78, paragraph 23. Su abo thc formally morc rcstrictcd approach of thc Barcelona 
and Balric Sca Convcntions. 
" For cxarnplc, undcr thc Convention on Long-rangc Transboundary Air Pollution m Europc, 1hrcc pro10-
cols havc so far bccn adoptcd. In addition to thc insttumcnrs on S02 and NO, (sec SUF" notc 6), rhcy 
includc thc Pro1ocol to thc 1979 Convcnrion on Long-rangc Transboundary Air Pollution on Long-tcrm 
Financing of thc Co-operative Programme for thc Monitoring and Evaluation of thc Long-rangc Trans-
mission of Air Pollutants in Europc (EMEP), 27 JIM 701 (1988). A fourth insttumcnt is bcing prcparcd. 
&~ Draft Protocol to the 1979 Convcntion on Long-rangc Transboundary Air Pollution Conccrning thc 
Conrrol of r.missions of Volatile Organic Compounds or thcir Transboundary Fluxcs, EB.AIR/WG.4/ 
R.12. 
" For cxamplc, sec amcndmcnts and adjustmcnts 10 thc Montreal Protocol in UNEIYOzLPro.2/3. 
14 Exampl~ of ministerial lcvd mcerings includc thc sixth session of thc Exccurive Body for thc Gcncva 
Convcnrion (Sofu 1988) that finalizcd and adoptcd thc NO, Protocol (sec ECE/EB.AIR/18); and thc 
Sccond Meeting of thc Parties to thc Montreal Protocol (London 1990), on thc occasion of thc final 
ncgotiarion and adoption of a comprchcnsivc packagc of rcvisions (sec UNEIYOzL.Pro.2/3). 
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regimes. 15 A special characteristic that these regimes share is the close relation-
ship between their normative "substance" and their decision-making procedures 
to implement, administer and develop prescriptions to meet the demand for 
quick legal action. 16 Law-making within these regimes is a quest for consensus 
among actors on the necessity for intemationally coordinated action. as well as 
on the basis for implemenring decisions to take action thus arrived at. As a result, 
a commonly accepted body of technical knowledge emerges within the regime. 
In the same fashion, a consensus on the prioriries of, and strategies for, 
intemationally coordinated action emerges which, in turn, produces a body of 
commonly accepted norms. The cognitive and normative aspects of the process 
are mutually reinforcing: changing knowledge demands an adaptation of norma-
tive prescriptions, whereas agreed-upon norms induce the generation of technical 
knowledge. Thus the conrinuous modification of international environmental 
law is not an intentional by-product of technological and scientific evolution. On 
the contrary, the pace of modification is deliberately accelerated by the mecha-
nisms established within international environmental regimes. 17 
While the type of international regimes discussed in this paper18 is based upon 
multilateral convenrions that tend to produce formally binding treaty law, com-
mon normative expectations at any given time are only parti.ally reflected in for-
mal legal instruments. Owing to the slow ratification and amendment procedure 
of international treaties, even far-reaching decisions are frequently contained in 
commonly accepted interpretarions, decisions, declarations and other instru-
ments that are below the threshold of formal international law. Moreover, inter-
national environmental regimes develop their own dispute settlement procedures 
within the respective issue-areas. Accordingly, dispute settlement procedures are 
organized consistent with the consensus-buildirtg process of communication 
within regimes. By intemalizing the making and application of international law 
within their respective issue-areas, international environmental regimes devdop 
into comparatively autonomous sectoral legal systems. 
" On thc notion of international rcgimc, sec Johnston, ··systemic Envirorunental Damage: Thc Challcngc 
to International Law .and Organiz.ation," 12 Syr~). lm'I L & Commmt 255, at 270 {1985). Su also 
Klein, "lntcmational Regimes.'· in R. Bernhard, ed .• 9 Enqcl~JW of Publu lnt'I /...aw 202 (1986). A thcor-
etical conccpt of international rcgimcs lus bccn dcvclopcd by U .S. intcnutional rclarions theorists; &t, 
~rally, S. Krasncr, cd .. lnttr114tion"1 &gi-s (1983); R. Kcohanc. A.far Htgmunty. Cooptration imJ DiscorJ 
in tht Wor/J Poli1w/ E<o-r (1984); 0. Young, lntnn41ional ~ratiort. &i/Jing &gimts /or Ndlural 
&sourcrs tltld tht Environnttnt (1989). 
1
• Though rcgimc theorisa gencrally de6ne international regimes as "scts of Un.plicit or cxplicit principlcs, 
nonns. rulcs, and. dccision-making proccdures around whicb actors' cxpectarions convcrge in a givcn 
area of international rclarions" (Krasncr. "Struetural Causcs and Regime Conscqucnccs." 36 Inter-
national Organization 186 (1982)), ncithcr thc impact of thc lattcr aspccr of dccision-malcing proccdurcs. 
nor thc rchtionship bctwccn normative and. dccision-malcing clcmcnu ha.s bccn thoroughly cxamincd. 
17 Stt J. Brunnec. Acid R.iin onJ Ozont Lryrr !Xplttion: lnlml4lianal Law imJ &gul..tion 265-268 (1988), who 
calls this a pragmatic ··m:magcmcnt approach. „ 
" Rcfcrcncc will bc madc throughout to thc cLaboratc and cxtrcmcly dynamic international cnvironmcntal 
rcgimes govcming long-nnge rransboundary air pollurion in Europc and thc prorcction o( thc ozonc 
layer, respccrivdy. 
38 Y.EARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL .ENVIKUNM.1:.N 1.1\L Ll\W 
II. SHAPING CONSENSUS 
Because the international legal system lacks a centralized authority for the 
crearion and enforcement of law, consensus, at least among the most important 
actors, is necessary for the creation of new rules of international law and their 
adaptation to changing conditions. Usually, consensus-build.ing involves exten-
sive negotiations. Organizing the process to shape consensus in a specific and 
often narrowly defined area of international relations is the most important opera-
tive function of an international regime. 
A. Sha[7ing Cognitive Expectations: The Technical Dimension 
"Technical" questions concerning the necessity for internationally coordi-
nated measures, as weil as the capacity19 of the concemed parries to act accord-
ingly, usually form the essence of international envirorunental issues. Because of 
the decentralized structure of the international system, actors cannot be expected 
to endeavor seriously to reduce or abate a specific form of pollution of the 
transnational environment until the need for such usually costly action has 
become sufficiently clear and until they have the capacity to take remedial 
action. Making the technical basis for political negoriations "sufficiently clear" 
does not necessarily imply a high threshold of scientific evidence. Rather, at 
stake is the joint appraisal and interpretation of scientific findings20 in an authori-
tative way within the regime, for political negotiations can set aside the considcr-
ation of scientific issues only if mutually acceptable scientific knowlcdge can be 
developed by a forum authorized by the participating actors. Thus, thc degree of 
scientific clarity is less important than the degree of unity in appraising the scien-
tific "state of the art." 
Policy questions (i.e., the deliberate setting of political goals and priorities) 
and questions about the "technical" basis of thcse policy decisions are often 
intermingled in thc bargaining proccss. Yet, to a large extent, international 
rcgimes address "technical" questions apart from political issues. Consider, fust, 
the question of the necessity for intemationally coordinated action. Within the 
regimes on long-range transboundary air pollution and the protection of the 
ozone layer, extensive consultative mechanisms forming irnportant structural 
parts of these institutions have been established to harmonize the interpretation 
and appraisal of scientific findings. 
One of the comerstones of the international regime on long-range 
transboundary air pollution, 21 indeed its very foundation, 22 is the "European 
19 On thc conccpt of "capacity" inilucncing thc proccss of cnvironmcntal politics (i.t., thc proccss of law-
mlling), sec V. Prittwicz, Das Katastroplirnparad= El~te dnn Thto.Y tiu Umwrlrpolitik 107-112 (1990). 
20 Stt Haas. "Do Regimes Muter? Epistemic Communitics and Mcditcrrancan Pollution Conttol." 43 
lntml4lio1141 Organiution 377 (1989). 
" Negotiations wcre inilucnccd by both environmcncal and .E2St-Wcst considerations. On thc former 
aspect. sec Wctstonc and Roscncranz, ''Transbouruhry Air Pollution: Thc Scarch for an International 
Response," 8 Harvard EU 89, at 100-107 (1984). On thc lattcr aspect, sec Choussudovsky, Sllf"O notc 7. 
22 Sincc thc program is mcntioncd in rathcr spccific tenns in ehe Final Act of thc Confercncc on Security 
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Monitoring and Evaluation Programme" (EMEP), established in 1979. In order 
to contribute to solving a major international environmental conilict that arose in 
Europe during the 1970s, EMEP was designed to account for the long-range 
transport of air pollutants in Europe, starting with sulphur dioxide (SO~). based 
upon calculations that process narionally supplied emission data and model 
meteorological conditions and atrnospheric chemistry. 
Unlikc past cases involving enviroronentally adverse effects of S02 emissions, 23 
damage to fish in Nordic lakes could not be easily traced back to emissions from 
nearby sources. As a first step toward intemationally agreed-upon pollution con-
trol measures, the Nordic countries had to establish the international relevance 
of the long-range transport of air pollutants. As long as the causal relationship 
between emissions in Great Britain, Germany or Poland and damage in the Nordic 
countries was not convincingly established, polluters could simply deny that 
reducing emissions would benefit acidified lakes in Scandinavia. 24 
Starting with the base years of the protocols on sulphur dioxides {1980) and 
nitrogen compounds (1987), EMEP provides tables showing annual transboundary 
transmission of these f'Ollutants. 2s Thus, European governments, as weil as the 
public, concerned industries and interested non-governmental organizations, are 
now aware of the origin of acid precipitation in any given country, 26 the degree 
to which deposition is produced in other countries, and the primary destination 
of the pollutants. All calculations are based upon an intemationally accepted data 
processing methodology. 27 Since the appropriateness of applied modeling methods 
is no longer seriously contested, political negotiations are free of disputes about 
22 tOnt. 
•nd C.ropcmion in Europc, Sccrion on ehe Environment (14 ILM 1309 (1975)). it c"1l truly b., consid-
cred ehe rooc of thc entire regimc. 
" Stt ehe famous Trai/ Smi!lter C'5C, 3 UNRIAA 1905; •nd Rc.d, "Tbc Trail Smelter Dispute," / CtmaJian 
Yt""1oo« of Int'l l.aw 213 (1963). 
" An initial program of a similar kind was carric:d out within thc: OECD, but was currailcd in part duc eo 
prcssure from m•jor pollucers. Stt Wctstonc and Roscncraiu. rupro notc 21 at 94-99. 
" &, SUld, "Regional Approachcs to Transboun<hry Air Pollution" in J. Helm. cd., Energy: ProJ.ution, 
Conrumption anti Comcquenm. at 246-249 (1989). For rccent calculations of Europcan sulphur and nitro-
gt'n "budgcts," sec EB.AIR/GE.1/16/Add. I. 
„ Stt ehe disdaimer in thc Convcntion rcgarding thc possiblc implications of thc: EMEP on thc inter-
national responsibilicy of polluting smes, including compensation for transnational damagc. Though thc 
disclaimer appean eo be acrachcd '5 • foocnote eo Arriclc 8. ic scc:ms, in fact, eo rcfer eo thc word "dam-
agc" and by its very wording ("Thc prescnt Convcntion docs not conta.in a rule on State liabilicy as to 
damagc') should apply to EMEP ll well. 
" Sincc emission figurcs arc supplied under national authoricy, thc harmonization of criterfa for thc collcc-
tion of d.tta b.,comcs a major issue within ehe program. In thc framcwork of EMEP, workshops on 
"cmission inventory" are rcgularly hcld. Stt EMEP rcport EB.AIR/GE.V16, paragraphs 32-3". Never-
thcless, thc supplicd dat• vary grcady in qualiry. Stt FracnlceL ''The Convc:ntion on Long·r"1lgc 
Transboundary Air Pollution: Meeting thc Challcnge oflntc:mational Coopcration," 30 HOTllflTJ ILJ 447, 
ar 460 (1989). Occasionally. missing d.t• have to bc: cstimated ..:cording to • muru.Jly agrced-upon pro-
ccdurc. Ycc, ic hu eo be emphasized chac these difficulties do not undcrminc thc ovcrall authority of 
EMEP calculations '5 a rcli•blc sourcc of information. 
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the significance and amowit of long-range transboundary air pollurion afllicting 
a particular cowitry. Within the international regime, EMEP has established the 
importance of the long-range, international aspects of air pollution in Europe 
with a degree of authority sufficient to suppon political negotiations proceeding 
within the regime. 2s 
During its first stages, the international regime for the protection of ehe ozone 
layer depended, to an equally high degree, on the authoritatively calculated 
impact of substances with an identified ozone-depleting potential. Since observa-
tions of the actual depletion of the ozone layer were not published witil 1985, 29 
coordinated international as weil as unilateral action was based solely on a theor-
etically derived relationship between ehe emission of chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and ozone deplecion and on atmospheric models. Prior to the entry into 
force of ehe Vienna Convention and ehe Montreal Protocol, 30 authoritacive eval-
uation and appraisal of scientific findings were performed by the Co-ordinating 
Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL).31 
Yet, institutionally, CCOL remained outside the regime, 32 and ehe Conven-
tion did not specifically provide for a committee on technical issues. 33 Character-
istic of the dynamic type of international legal regulation explored in ehe present 
paper, ehe regime developed its own mechanism for evaluating scientific findings 
at the first review of the control measures stipulated in the Montreal Protocol. 34 
21 Equally imponant (b\it ccnainiy lcss advanccd) is a cotnprchcnsivc rcsearch program on thc effects of .:i.ir 
pollutants on forests, rivcrs and lakcs, buildi!tg$ and agricultural crops. Results will bc discusscd in a 
Worlcing Group on Elfern. a permanent sul>-commitrec of thc Executivc Body for thc Gcncva Conven-
rion. On thc curtcnt statc of thc four International Co-operative Programmes for Asscssment and Moni-
toring of Air Pollution Effccts, cstablishcd pursuanr ro Arride 7. paragraph d of thc Gcneva Convcnrion. 
sec EB.AIR/WG.1/14. paragraphs 10-15. 
29 S« K.indt and Mcnefcc, "The Vexing Problem of Ozonc Dcplcrion in International Environmcntal Law 
and Policy." 24 1°eX4S ILJ 261. ar 280-282 (1989). 
lO Ncgoriations on rhc Monttcal Ptorocol bcgan long bcforc thc cntty into force of the Vicnna Convcnrion. 
Thereforc. thcy did not procced wirhin thc fratnework of thc confcrcncc of contracring partics ro thc 
convcnrion. but rathcr within UNEP. Stt Resolution 2 of thc Final Act of thc 1985 Vicnna Confcrcncc 
of Plcnipotcnriarics on thc Protccrion of thc Ozone Layer. 26 JIM 1523 (1987). 
" Stt rcpons and summarics of scicnrific asscssmcnts from CCOL to thc politica.l worbng groups on thc 
framcwork convcnnon and thc protocol: UNE!YWG.69/6; UNEWWG.78/12; UNEP/WG.110/3; 
UNEIYWG.151/Backgtound 3. CCOL was foundcd by UNEP in 1977. &t rcpon of thc UNEP Gov-
crning Council l9n, UNEP/GC/106, Dccision 84MC. ar 123. 
" Givcn thc composition of thc Comtnittcc, incorporarion into an intccgovcrnrnental convcntion scctncd 
difficult. Stt UNEIYWG.69, paragraph 22. Thc Commitrcc consisted of a limircd nwnbcr of inrcrcstcd 
govcmments and conccmed indusnial associations. lndustry 's collaborarion was panicularly important as 
production figurcs of ozonc-dcplcring subsranccs. on which modcling had 10 bc based. could only bc 
supplicd by produccn. 
" This was apparently ro avoid duplication of work, although carly drafts of thc Convcnrion con~ed 
proposals for such a tcchnical body. &r Articlc 8 (Scicnrific-Tcchnologica.I Advisory Body/Mcchartisms) 
and commcnrary in UNEFYWG.78/2. 
14 Thc rcvicw proccss bcgan on an informal basis almost immcdiatcly aftcr conclusion of the Ptotocol 
(SeptcmbcT 1987) but prior to its cntry into forcc (January 1989). Ar its firsc session (May 1989), thc con-
fcrcncc of thc partics of thc Ptorocol took ovcr supcrvision. &t Dccision 11/3, UNEJo/OzLPto.1/5. ar 
14. 
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A "scientific" panel of expertS evaluated recent calculations of the degree and 
rate of the depletion of the owne layer, while an "environmental" panel 
reviewed research on the effects of stratospheric ozone depletion on human life 
and the biosphere. 35 The panels reported to a working group on the revision of 
the Protocol. 36 Hence, even before the formal entry into force of ehe Protocol, 
the assessment of scientific findings by designated experts (with a view to facili-
tating political negotiations) was carried out within the structure of the regime. 
Having been appraised by govemmental delegations within the political working 
group revising the Protocol, 37 these assessments laid an authoritative foundation 
for negotiations. 
In sum, both the long-range transboundary air pollution and protection of the 
ozone layer regimes establish mechanisms to develop information regarding the 
abatement of certain types of pollution for the purpose of facilitating political 
negotiations. Such information is prepared by experts in their respective fields, 
subject to the approval of the authorized sub-committees of the conference of 
parties. Thus, the above two regimes produce "in-house," i.e., on their own, a 
body of commonly agreed-upon technical knowledge that is widely accepted as a 
valid basis for political negotiarions. 
However, assessment of scientific evidence is only one essential aspect of any 
effective, internationally coordinated strategy of pollution control. Another 
equally important conditioning factor is the technological capability to implement a 
control strategy commensurate wich the findings of the assessment process. 
During the major 1990 revisions of the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Con-
venrion, deliberations on the technological capability to reduce the consumption 
of ozone-depleting substances were of utmost importance. While earlier rounds 
of negotiations focused on the relarively easy challenge of eliminating CFCs as 
spray-can propellants, the new round had to address the question of idenrifying 
available subsritutes for more sophisticated applications of CFCs and halons. 38 As 
scienrific data strongly suggested the need for an accelerated rimetable for the 
reduction and eventual phase-out of these substances, the margin for possible 
intemationally coordinated action became a function of technological capability. 
" Stt UNEP Scicncific Review of Ozone uycr Modilication and its Jml"'ct• UNEP/Sc.l/2 (Nore by thc 
Exccutive Dircctor UNEP). Prior to thc entry into force of the Protocol, the work plan and timettblc for 
thc pands wcrc approved by an inrergovemmental Working Group on Harmonizarion of Datt on Pro-
ducnon. Importsand Exports ofSubstanccs that Dcpletc the Ownc Layer. See UNEWOzLWG.Datt.2/ 
3/Rcv.2, paragraph 25. Thc Working Group was emblished according to Resolution 3 of thc Final Act 
of thc 1987 Montreal Confcrencc of Plenipotcnnarics on thc Prorocol on Chlorofluorocarbons to thc 
Vicnna Convcntion on thc Protcction of thc Ozonc uycr. 26 ILM 1549 (1987). 
'
6 Revisions wcre adopred at rhe Second Meeting of thc Parties in 1990. Stt Report of thc Meeting, UNEW 
OzL.Pro.2/3. 
n Stt "Synrhcsis Report."" UNEWOzLPro.WG.11(1)/4. 
" CFCs arc, in particular. uscd as blowmg agents for plastic foams. coolants in refrigcrators and ~r 
condirioncrs, and as solvems; haJons are uscd in fuc...:xringuishers. On consumpcion figurcs, broken 
down by uses, sec Report of thc ~nd of Tcchrucal Assessment. Exccurive Summary, OzL.Pro.Asm.l/ 
lnf.3. 
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A panel of experts delivered a detailed report exploring the technological 
capability for substituting ozone-depleting gases. 39 The report was, in fact, pre-
pared by representatives of the major companies involved in both the production 
of ozone-depleting substances and the development of substitutes. Thus, the 
panel's exposition of the technological capability issue irnplied also industry's 
acceptance of the report's proposed strategies. 
Similarly, as one of the first steps in its work on nitrogen oxides (NO.), the 
Executive Body for the Geneva Convention decided to prepare an inventory of 
control technologies.•0 This inventory formed an important basis for negotiarions 
on a NOx Protocol within the political Working Group on Nitrogen Oxidcs.41 
The same is also true of current work on a future protocol on volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs).42 Yet, the inventory also has direct legal implications as it 
provides the basis for a technical annex to the Protocol. Thus, joint assessment of 
the technological capability for intemationally coordinated action forms an 
integral part of the law-making process in both international regimes. 
In more abstract terms, the purpose of this technical dimension of the law-
making process within international environmental regimes is to build consensus 
primarily on the assessment of knowledge. As a body of knowledge common to 
all parricipants gradually builds up, actors come to "trust" calculations based 
upon models and rely upon inventories of control technologies developed within 
the regime. In the end, actors interpret (and expect others to interpret) events 
and occurrences in a similar way}3 The body of technical knowledge concemed 
gives rise to what may be called "cognirive expectations," i.e., expectations 
based on knowledge. Thus the fact that the Antarctic ozone hole is regularly 
reviewed within the regirne on the protection of the ozone layer44 implies that 
scientifically observed changes will have to be measured against the cxisring 
shared body of knowledge built up within that regime. Only this procedure will 
produce commonly accepted interpretations or adjustments of technical knowledge. 
" For •n overview of the panel's patticiparion, see UNE~OzL.Pro.1/5, Annex V. 
'° At its first session in 1983, the Executive Body ~d already entrusted the Working Party an Air Pollution 
Problems with dnwing up an invcntory of conttol tcchnologies. &t ECE/EB.AIR/I. Annex IV. Thc 
Working Party is fonnally rclatcd to thc ECE. not the saucrurc cstablishcd undcr thc Convcnrion. How-
cvcr, ir discharges tcchnical work for the Exccutivc Body and repom direcdy to it. Thc cstablishmcnt of 
a new tcchnical worlring group lus bc:en suggcstcd within thc Execurivc Body. which would inrcmali:tc 
thc work donc up to now in thc Working Party on Air Pollution Problems. 
" Stt Report of thc Third Session. EB.AIR/WG.3/6. paragraphs 28-39. 
•> Apart from consultations among dcsignatcd govcrruncntal cxpcrts on VOC emissions from stationary 
sources. a Task Force on Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC) from Stationary Sourccs was 
establishcd. Rcsults arc cxpccrcd to cntcr thc futurc protocol as a tcchnical anncx. Stt EB.AIR/WG.4/8, 
paragraphs 21-27. Thc protocol should bc: ready for adoprion at the ncxr mccting of the E.xccurivc Body. 
latc in 1991. 
" A rcgimc comprising a body of common knowlcdgc may bc considercd a "socia.I systcm." Stt N. 
Luhmann. Sczidlt SysttrM. Grundriss tintr idl~m T1ito.Y (1988). According to this approach. social sys-
tcms arc not composcd of actors (i.t .• dclcgatcs or dclegarions). but rathcr units of communicarion. 
„ For rcgimes conccmcd with other isrue-areas. such information will bc: largely irrelevant and most prob-
ably will not bc considcred at all. 
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B. Shaping Normative Expectations: The Political Dimension 
Agreements on scientific evidence and technological capability for inter-
nationally coordinated action set the bases for political choicesH about the 
regime's priorities,46 policies and strategies. International envirorunental regimes 
facilitate the process, in particular, by providing a permanent forum of discus-
sion47 that lowers considerably the threshold for putting new issues on the 
agenda48 and encourages negotiations on a specific instrument. 
lt is important to note that, while discussion may proceed within, as well as 
outside, the regime's structure, authoritarive decisions can only be taken within 
the regime itsel( This fact has an irnportant impact on international law-making 
since the decision-making process within the regime becomes the focal point of a 
whole range of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activities. The negotiacion 
process that eventually Ied to the adoption of the S02 Protocol illustrates this 
relationship. 
At the first session of the Executive Body Oune 1983), a number of states pro-
posed the adoption of an instrument on S02 {as well as NO,) emissions.49 During 
that meeting, several countries unilaterally declared their intention to reduce 
S02 emissions by at least 30% by 1993 at the latest. 50 Even though the declar-
ations were made at the official session of the Executive Body, these Statements 
were hardly more than inputs of individual countries into the communicarive 
process involving the regime on long-range transboundary air pollution. 
The purpose of these declarations is obvious: they reinforced the demand for 
modifying the legal status of transboundary S02 emissions within the regime 
and, at the same time, suggested a particular approach for an international regu-
lacion of the problem. 51 Since the proposal was unsuccessful, the "30% Club" 
" From thc principlcs codifying thc broad ovcrall goals of a rcgime •fonc, spccific prescriprions cannot bc 
dcrived. Stt Krasncr, supra notc 17 at 187; Kohlcr-Koch, "Zur Empirie und Theorie intemationalor 
Regime" in B. Kohler-Koch, cd„ &gime in dm int~matiDll<ll~n &zitlrwn~n 17, at 40 {1989). On thc nor-
mative ambiguiry of rulcs. sec L. Chcn, An lntroduction to Contmrporary lntmiational Ltw 13 ( 1989). 
" Stt thc Minisrcri•l Dcclararion of thc Second World Climatc Confcrence {Gencva. 7 November 1990), 
in particular. paragraphs 5, 7. 12. 16, 20 and 25, for a clear juxtaposirion of conflicting enviroruncntal 
and cconomic goals. 
" In rhis rcgard, thc function of international rcgimcs approximates thar of international organizations. Yct, 
ir musr not bc forgoncn 1ha1 thc issuc-arcas organizcd by international rcgimes arc usually nanowly 
defincd and, to • ccrtain cxtcnt, conncctions wtth conflicting issucs arc therefore prccludcd. 
" For example. rhc initiatives conccming intem•nonal regulation to rcducc S02 •nd NO, cmissions 
(launched at thc first scssion of thc Exccurivc Body undcr thc Geneva Convention) failed. Yct, the pro-
posals on SO, and NO, succccdcd at thc sccond and third scssions. rcspcctively, with thc cstablishment 
of working groups prcparing spccific protocols. Stt ECE/EB.AIR/4, paragraph 19 and ECE/EB.AJR/7, 
paragraph 31. 
" Stt EB.AIR/I, paragraphs I0-17. 
"' Stt ECE/EB.AIR/I, paragraph 25 {Decision A(l)). Rcmarlcably, thc Sovict Union joincd this group of 
countrics. Su Vygcn, "Urging for a Firm Clean-Air Policy Across National Borders," 11 EPL, 34, 35 
(1983). 
" This is a flat-ratc rcducnon (and not, for cxamplc, a rcgul.ation by usc) by a spccific margin (.3-0%) until a 
parricular datc (1993). 
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endeavored to organize broader support for the second meeting of the Executive 
Body. First, the "30% Club" picked up suppon at a ministerial conference in 
Ottawa in March 1984 when a number of interested Western countries fonnally 
adopted a joint declaration whose sole purpose was to exert influence on the dis-
cussion process within the regime. 52 Second, the other countries in the regime 
were invited to attend a further conference in June 1984, with the aim of 
expanding the "30% Club."5J On that occasion, a number of Eastem European 
cowitries joined the "30% Club," thus providing the opportunity for the ;;;dop-
tion of a binding protocol within the structure of the regime.54 Against this 
backdrop, the Executive Body established a working group to prepare a protocol 
on 502 emissions at its second session in September 1984. 55 
The evolution of the ozone layer regime provides another illustracion of the 
function of international envirorunental regimes as focal points of a broad, 
legally significant communication process. In March 1989, the Council of 
Environmental Ministers of the European Community proclaimed a phase-out of 
ozone-depleting CFCs by the end of the century. This decision had been 
adopted in response to pressure emanaring from a series of international confer-
ences on the protection of the ozone layer. 56 In March of that year, the British 
government held a ministerial levd" global conference on "Saving the Ozone 
Layer" which sought to broaden the support for a rapid revision of the Montreal 
Protocol in favor of an early phase-out of CF Cs. [n May 1989, the First Meeting 
" Stt paragraph 4 of die Oedararion: 'lhe Signatoncs call upon thc othcr ~rtics 10 thc Convenrion to 
join rhem, witlrirt tht ft,,_r/t of 1hc G>nW11tion, in implemcnring reductions of nariorul ann~ sulphur 
c:missions or of thcir rransboundary fiuxcs by at least thirty per ccnc by 1993 ... " (emphasis added). 
Dcdararion reprintcd in 12 EPL 86 (1984). 
" Confercncc on ehe Causes and Prevcnrion of Damagc to Forcsa and Waten by Air Pollution in Europe 
(Munich 1984). 1be prcamblc of thc latcr Protocol cxprcssly rcfers to rhc Munich Confcrt"ncc, cmpha-
sizing the dircct rdacionship of rhis Confercncc (which proccedcd outside rhat rcgime) .md thc SO, Pro-
cocol (adopted within rhac rcgime). 
„ P.lrrics agrccd to r..quest "that at its sccond mecring, die hccurive Body as a nutter of highcst priority 
adoprs a proposal for a spccific agr„ement on the reduction of annual national sulphur cmissioru or their 
tunsboundary fluxes by 1993 at thc latest." &t operative paragraph II of the Munich Declararion, Sum· 
mary Rccords of the Munich Conference. This is particularly renw-kable. since a numbcr of rcgimc 
counrrics had not joined thc ")()% Club" and possibly would have stayed out of thc proposcd instru-
ment. Both thc Ottawa and the Munich Dedararions also refer to action within rhe regime with rcgard 
to NO, emissions. 
" 1be Protocol W25 adoptcd by conscnsus at thc Executive Body's third scuion. &t ECE/EB.AIR/7, para-
graph 17. Since not cvcry regime country signed the irumuncnt, its adopcion by conscnsus is rathcr sig-
nificant with respect to thc regimc's law-making process. Bcsides the Protocol, a resolurion rd1ecting the 
posirion of thesc other states was adopted. Stt ECE/EB.AIR/7, Annex II. 
56 On thc decision-making process within the European Communiry. sec Jachtcnfuchs, 'lhe European 
Communiry and the Protcction of rhc Omne Layer," 28 joMrruJ of °"""""' Mnt Slul&s 261, at 271 
(1990). During negotiarions ofthe Montreal Protocol, the Europcan Cotnmuniry had bccn a major stum· 
bling block. Stt Lang, "Diplomatie zwischen Ökonomie and Ökologie," 43 EIUOpd·Arclriv 105 (1988). 
" The conferencc was attended by dclegarions &om about 123 countrics, of which 80 wcre represcnted at 
the ministerial levcl. 
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of the Parties to the Protocol agreed on a phase-out of CFCs by the year 200058 
and decided to launch negoriations immediately thereafter. 59 
In general terms, the political dimension of the regime process is concemed 
primarily with shaping consensus on behavior. Much like the emergence- of com-
mon technical k.nowledge, a body of commonly accepted normative prescrip-
tions, or common "normative expectations," will gradually build up within the 
regime. However, unlike their cognitive counterparts, normative expectations 
are generally resistant to change even in the face of contrafactual occurrences. 60 
If an actor does not behave according to common normative expectations, this 
fact alone will not induce a change of the relevant prescriptions and related 
expectations. If a country does not reach the 30% reduction goal stipulated in the 
S02 Protocol in time, the prescription nevertheless remains in force. While 
mechanisms for stabilizing norms against unintended change are developed,61 
this does not, of course, predude intentional modification. 
Given these differences, what is the relationship of the two distinct bodies of 
expectations developed within the limits of the regime? First, normative pre-
scriptions governing a given issue-area are based on cognitive expectations 
among actors as a group. If these expectations undergo change, the related nor-
mative expectations have to be modified accordingly and prescriprions have to 
be adapted. The continuing adaptation of the normative framework of the inter-
national regime on the protection of the ozone layer to rapidly changing k.now-
ledge regarding the elements of both necessity and capacity62 exemplifies the 
dynamics of the regime. Likewise, an updated technical annex to the NO, Proto-
col63 containing guidelines and technical target dates, which is currently being 
prepared, is expected to generate normative expectations even without modifica-
tion of the Protocol itself.64 Frequently. instnunents stipulate periodic review of 
adopted strategies and measures in light of scientific findings and technological 
progress.65 Hence, any change in relevant k.nowledge aimost automaticaIIy 
entails a demand for adaptation of related prescriprions. 
" S.r Hdsmkt-Declaration. OzL.Pro.1/5. /\ppcrulix 1. Thc Dcc!Mation is nor pan of rhc legal frarncwork 
of rhc rcgimc and rhc confcrcncc of partics (in ilS official capacity as an authorizcd dccision-making 
cntiry) only coole noce of ir. See Dcciston 15. Yet, whilc noc considcrcd kgally binding. ehe Dccbution is 
broadly significanl smcc it was supponed by many countrics participating as obscrvers which would nol 
bc bou nd by rhe regimc 's dccisions. 
1
• Helsinki. May 19!19. See UNEP/OzLPro.1/5. The Second Meeting adopted a comprchensivc paclcagc of 
adjustrnenrs and amcndmenls. Su UNE!o/OzL.Pro.2/3. 
60 On rhe distinction betwccn "cogrutivc" arul "normative" expcctations, sec N. Luhmann. Rtthworio/ogit 
40-53 (1983). 
61 Su infra scction 3. 
62 Su Gehring, "Das inrernationale Regime zum Schurz der Ozonschicht," 45 &ropa-Arcltiv 703 (1990). 
"' Su dccision of rhe Executive Body ( 1989) requcsring rhat ehe Worlcing Party on Air Pollution Problems 
bcgin preparing an update, ECE/EB.AIR/20, paragraph 44. 
„ By accepting thc "basic obligations" of thc NO, Prococol (Articlc 2. paragraphs 2a-c), states commirtcd 
themsclvcs eo dcvclop cmission srandards in accord wirh rhc guidclines in rhc techrucal anncx 10 rhc Pro-
locol. 
•• Stt Articlc 6 of thc Montreal Prorocol and Articlc 5 of rhc NO, Protocol. 
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Second, normative prescriptions may be intended to directly affect rescarch 
and development conceming pollution reduction sttategies. They may indicate 
to addressees (e.g., a particular industty or a group of contracting states) the pro-
jected future development of a regime's body of normative prescriptions. For 
example, the resolution adopted by the Second Meeting of the Parties to the 
Montreal Protocol on the use of particular substituces for traditional CFCs was 
intended tosend "strong signals" to industty regarding the careful use of harm-
ful, but still uncontrolled, substitutes as weil as the development of less problem-
atic substances.66 Similarly, the NO, Protocol (in addition to the targeted freeze 
on NO. emissions) contains a clause on the development of the "critical load" 
approach67 which sets forth a scientifically supported basis for international regu-
lation beyond the rather simple but nevertheless effective flat-rate reduction 
approach. If adopted,68 ic may, in cum, be expected to be a model for future 
instruments negotiated within the regirne. Hence, some normative prescriptions 
are intended eo actively induce changes in knowledge entailing subsequent modi-
fications of prescriptions. 
Frequent changes in international environmental law cannot be considered an 
Wldesired disturbance of an otherwise stable body of law. On thc contrary, 
change and devclopment oflaw is desirable, and a continuing process that adapts 
normative prescriptions to changing conditions is deliberately institutionalized. lt 
opens up the possibility for a step-by-step approach to the claboration of a sec-
toral legal system.69 For example, the reccntly adopted revision of the Montreal 
Protocol contains obligations to reconsider or defi.ne target dates for three groups 
of controlled substances in 199270 and the NO. Protocol, which considers the 
freeze on ernissions as simply "a first step," obliges contracting parties to begin 
negotiarions on further steps no later than six months after thc instrwnent's entry 
into force, and to adopt measures by 1 January 1996.71 
„ Stt UNEP/OzL.Pro 2/3, paragraph 51. and Annex VII on thc use of „othcr halons" and partially 
halogcnatcd CFCs. In this rcgard. ic is an mempc to envi„~ legal rules prior to technological dcvclop-
mcnts; on thc rclationship becwccn thesc two elcmcnts, sec Rudolf, "'Tcchnological Devclopment and 
Codification of International Law", lL Jroi1 intemation.J <i l'hn<rt tk Sll codifoalion. E1udt1 tn l'ltonnn.r tk 
Robtrto Ago 433 ( 1987). 
•
1 Article 1, paragraph 7 of thc NO, Prococol defincs „crirical load'" as "a quantitative cstimatc of the 
cxposurc to onc or more pollutants bclow which significant ~nnful cffccu on spccificd sensitive clc-
mcnts of thc envuonmcnt do not occur according to prcsent knowlcdgc." 
„ Considcrable effort is CUITcntly being dcvotcd to thc claboration of this approach. Stt thc rccent pro-
grcss rcports ofthe Working Group on Abatement Saacegiei, EB.AlR/WG.5/8 and ECE/EB.AlR/R.53, 
as weil as of thc Task. Fotcc on Mapping, EB.AlR/WG.5/R.12. 
•• On insritutional dcvelopmcnts promoting Ocxibiliry of international cnvironmcntal legal insaumcnts. 
sec P. Sand. lns<ms l..L11md in Global Environmmt41 Gawma1u (1990). 
'
0 &t UNElo/OzL.Pro.2/3. Amicx 1. Article 2A, paragraph 6 (originally conaollcd CFCs); Artidc 2B, para-
graph 4 {considcration of essential uscs of conaollcd halons); Annex II, Articlc 2E, paragraph S (mcdtyl 
chlorofonn). 
" &t NO, Protocol, Articlc 2. paragraphs 1 and 3. 
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III. DYNAMIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 
A. The Legal Structure 
International environmental regimes discussed in the present paper are based 
on formal multilateral conventions. Fundamental obligations are codified in for-
mal protocols and/or annexes to these convenrions. Usually, a regline's formal 
legal structure consists of a relatively stable framework convention with a high 
threshold for amendments, and protocols and/or annexes featuring a simplified 
amendment procedure. 72 To ease the adaptarion of this structure as necessary, a 
nwnber of techniques are used. For example, provision is occasionally made for 
amendments of the formal legal structure to enter into force for countries that 
fail to give timely notice of their objection.73 Similarly, decisions to adjust con-
trol measures regarding substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol become 
binding on all parties to the Protocol when approved by a two-thirds majority. 74 
These steps tend to speed up the process of adapting legal obligations to changing 
cognitive expectations considerably. Nevertheless, the regulation of important 
aspects of the normative structure of international regimes must occur outside 
this body of formal treaty law. 
First, diplomaric conferences are, all too often, not in a position to deal with 
all relevant questions relating to an adopted instrument. Relatively minor, but 
nevertheless important, issues are frequently excluded from an agreed "package 
deal" on the understanding that negotiations thereon will immediately ensue. 
For example, upon the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, a resolution of the 
diplomatic conference requested that the Executive Director of UNEP convene 
a working group to prepare a report clarifying data reporting requirements. 75 
Based on this report, 76 the First Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol 
adopted decisions on the confidentiality of data and on the clarification of defini-
tions and terms. 77 These "clarifications" are, in fact, interpretations of more gen-
.,, Su the report of the first s.:.sion of the working group on thc Vieruu Convenrion, which considers • 
„ ßCJtible approach . . . nccessary in ordcr ro .Uow the :iccornmodation of scientific lcnowledge and policy 
alternatives as they bccome av;Ulable," UNEWWG.69/IO, paragraph IO. 
'' Su Barcelona Convcnnon (Art:iclc 16). Str also thc procedure of thc Paris Convcnrion (Articlc 18, para-
gnph 4) on thc amendment of anncxes. On proccdures for a spcedy revision of spccific instruments, s.:e 
Bossc:lmann, "Die fcsueczung und Bindungswirkung intcmarionaler technischer Regeln und Standards 
~m Schurz der Umwelt," 5 Umwdr-und Planungmclit 272 (1985). 
" Stt Anicle 2, pangraph 9(c) and (d) of thc Montreal Protocol. While thesc clauscs may bc surprissng. 
instirutional llcxibility was obra.incd in cxchange for a morc moderate provision in subsuncc. S~t Euro-
pean Community proposals, UNEIYWG.172/2, at 15. 
" Stt Resolution 3 of rhc Final Aa of the Confcrencc of Plenipotentiaries on the Protocol on 
Chlorolluorocarbons to thc Vicnna Convcntion for the Protecrion of thc Omnc Laycr, 26 llM 1549 
(1987). 
'• Stt Report of the Working Group. UNE!YWG.Data.2/3/Rcv.2. paragraphs 16-21. 
" Stt Dccisions 11.11 and 11.12.A-F in Report of thc Meeting, UNEP!OzLPro.1/5. For examplc, thc renn 
"developing country"' is defined with far-reaching implications rcgarding obligatory commiancnts. The 
formal basis for thcs.: intcrpretarions is conrained in Aniclc 11, paragnph 4(d) of the Protocol. 
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eral treaty obligations. They were adopted by consensus and thus have become 
part of the normative cxpectations built up within the regime. 
Second, authoritarive interpretations by the permanent conferences of inter-
national regimes may close unintended gaps left open in prior negoriations. At 
the request of the Soviet Union, 78 the Montreal Protocol, under certain con-
ditions, pcrmits an incrcase of producrion bcyond 1986 levels. At its first meet-
ing, the conferencc "dccided" by consensus that such a production incrcase may 
not be used for export to non-parties of thc Protocol. 79 The Execurive Body for 
the Geneva Convention bridged a gap in the SOrProtocol in a similar fashion, 
i.e., by way of interpretation. Contracting parties undertake to reduce 502 emis-
sions by at least 30% by 1993 at the latcst. The Protocol, however, does not 
address the pcriod aftcr 1993. Therefore, the Executive Body "noted a common 
understandi.ng among ehe Parties"80 that an increase in such emissions after 1993 
would be inconsistent with the Protocol. 
Third, a permanent conferencc of parries might choose to circumvent, or evcn 
ignore, ccrtain provisions of ehe relevant framework convention. At the Second 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol, statcs adopted a comprehensive 
"Amendmcnt" to the Protocol.81 Formally, amendmcnts to protocols enter into 
force after "at least two-thirds of the partics of ehe protocol concemed" have 
submitted eheir instruments of ratification, acccptance or approval.82 Yet, the 
1990 Amcndmcnt requires only 20 such instruments to enter into forcc, i.e., of 
only one-third of the parties. 83 While thc intention not to dclay thc Amend-
mcnt's entry into force may be understandable,84 the approach is not sanctioncd 
by the language of the Convenrion. 85 Thus, states may have tacitly amended thc 
relevant provision of ehe Convention howcver ambiguous the formal legal foun-
dation of this step may be.86 
" Stt P. Sand, mpra norc 69 ar 6. 
„ Stt Dccision ll.12G lJNEIYOzl..Pto.1/5, ar 19, on thc daruiation of Attide 2, paragnph 6. Thc Dcci-
sion had bcen prcpared by ehe working group on dara rcporring. Stt UNEP/WG.Dara2/2. paragraph 2J. 
„ Stt rcport of ehe scvcnrh scssion of rhe Exccurivc Body, ECE/Eß.AJR/20. paragraph 22. 
11 Stt Decision 11/2, UNEFYOzL.Pto.2/J. 
" Stt Anicle 9, paragraph 5. Since thc Prorocol does not conrain a provision on amendmenr proccdures, 
the rules of thc Vieruu Convention apply. Decision 11/2 expressly refcrs to rhe procedure of Aniclc 9, 
paragraph 4 of rhc Convcnrion. 
11 Stt Anide 2 of rhe Amendment. Immed.iarcly prior to the Sccond Meeting, thc Scaerary notcd that 58 
sures plus thc Europcan Community had submiacd thcir instnuncnts. Stt UNEPIOzL.Pro.2/2/Add.t. 
" Thc confcrcncc of thc partics to thc Protocol rccommcndcd to rhc confcrcncc of thc panics to thc Con-
vcnrion an amcndmcnt of thc amcndmcnr procedurc for Prorocols conraincd in Articlc 9 of thc Convcn-
tion. &t Dccision 11/16, UNEPIOzL.Pro.2/3, at 18. 
" According to Articlc 41 of thc Vicnna Convcntion of thc uw ofTrcarics, two or morc parries to a multi-
lateral trcaty may modify its provisions in thcir bilateral rclationship as long as this is nor prccluded by 
thc trcaty. But this may bc difficult to apply hcrc sincc modificarion is intcnded 10 conccm oll contracting 
partics. Stt Ott, "Thc New Montreal Protocol: A Small Stcp for thc Protcction of thc Ozonc Laycr, A 
Big Stcp for lnrcrnational Law and Relations" (forthcoming). 
16 lt was disputcd, howcvcr. whcthcr such a "pragmatic approach" was apyropriatc. Stt rcport of thc 
working group. UNEPIOzLPro.WGlll(t)/3, paragraph 15. In thc Draft Amcndmcnt (Annex II, at 26), 
thc nwnbcr of instrumcnts rcquircd for thc entry into forcc rcmaincd in s.quarc bracken. 
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Fourth, equally significant is the procedure by which States at the First Meet-
ing of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted the "Ozone Depleting 
Potential"(OPD) figure for one of the controlled halons. Since Annex A to the 
Protocol called for this figure "to be determined," discussion arose on the ques-
tion of whether the figure had to be inserted by way of an amendment to the 
Annex or whether a mere interpretation sufficed. The latter approach was chosen 
for the sake of simplicity.87 Hence, the First Meeting of the Parties decided "to 
accept the value for the Ozone Deplcting Potential (ODP) for halon 2402 as 
6,0" and to request that the Secretariat infonn thc depository that the parties 
agreed to accept this figure by consensus and that, accordingly, the depository 
should insert this figure to replace the words "tobe detennined" in Annex A to 
the Montreal Protocol.88 Given the circumstances of this particular issue, a mere 
interpretation did not suffice. Instead, the depository had to modify the text of 
the annex by inscrting thc agreed-upon 6gure. Yet this was done neither according 
to the ordllury amendment procedure as provided for in thc Vienna Conven-
tion, nor any specific provision of the Protocol: its sole basis was the consensus 
among the parties to the Protocol. 
Fifth, and even more surprising, is that by a simple decision the Second Meet-
ing of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol established an Interim Multilateral 
Fund to support ozone-friendly technology in developing countries. 89 Neither 
the framework convention nor the Protocol contains a specific legal basis for 
such a far-reaching step90 which places comparatively heavy financial obligations 
on member states. lt is ohvious that negotiators did not consider this issue at the 
time the Protocol was adopted in 1987. 91 The decision, which entered into force 
immediately, involvcs a financial commitment of up to US$240 million for the 
first three-year period (1991-1993). The contracting parties agreed to contribute 
to the fund in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale. Contrib-
urions thus must be considered virtually "mandatory," even though language of 
this kind was avoided. Politically, an early establishment of the funding mecha-
nism was desirable to induce developing countries to join the Protocol and 
accept its obligations. The fact remains, however, that establishment of a multi-
million dollar fund simply by a decision of an intergovernmental body is an 
intemationally unprecedented event. 
17 Stt Report of the Prcpantory Group, UNEP/WG.Oata.2/3/ Rev.2„ Annex II, paragraph 6. 
11 Stt Dccision 11.9 of UNEWOzl..Pro.1/5, at 16. 
" Stt Oc::ciSion ll/8A (Financi.al Mtthani>m), and Appendix IV {Tenns of Refcrcnce of thc Interim Multi-
lateral Fund). UNE!YOzL.Pto.2/3. 
90 Note, ho-vcr. thc residual clause of Artide 11. paragraph 40) of thc Prorocol, empo-ring thc confer-
ence to "consider and undcrtakc :my additional action !hat might be required for the achievement of the 
purposcs of this Protocol." in conncction with Article 5, paragraph 3, requiring the parties to „facilitate 
... thc provision of subsidics. aids. credits. . .. " 
91 Thc Interim Multilateral Fund was. thcreforc. establishcd by a rcgular dccision on substantivc matten 
which, undcr Article 40 of thc Rulcs of Proccdurc (Ke UNEWOzLPro.1/5. Annex t ). requires a mcrc 
rwo-thirds majority. On the legal basis and procedural implications of dris dccision, sec Ott. RIJ1'11 notc 
85. 
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All these decisions remain below the level of formal treaty law. On the one 
hand, interpretations of a given tteaty adopted by the consensus of contracting 
states would appear tobe unproblematic; 92 on the other band, circumvention of 
applicable provisions of the relevant framework convention and ehe establish-
ment of a multi-million dollar multilateral fund by decisions of the conference of 
the parties might be viewed as presenting a more difficult issue.93 However, the 
eff ectiveness of all these decisions, indeed, of virtually all substantive decisions 
adopted so far within the two international environmental regimes discusscd, 
rests on consensus among the partics. 94 Regardless of any possible unccrtainty 
about thc legal basis and formal legal effects of thcse dccisions, they havc 
become part of the normative structures of thc international regimes concemed; 
consensual decisions will not be challenged on formal growids because negotia-
tions bring participating states95 to the point at which they are able and willing to 
accept the decisions. Thus, formal soundness may be sacrificed in cxchangc for 
pragmatic and swift decision-making by consensus. In short, the normative struc-
ture of a regime reflects varying degrees of formal law,96 or, in othcr words, is 
only partially reflected in instruments that rise to the level of international trcaty 
law proper. 
B. The Judicial Function 
An essential component of any legal system, including sectoral legal syscems, is 
the mechanism for dispute settlement. Disputes have both an individual and a 
group aspect. On the individual side,97 parties direcdy involved in a given con-
flict may be primarily concerned with settling their respective substantive claims 
without much regard for the normative implications for the regime as a whole. 
They will, at first, attempt to reach an acceptable settlement whether by negotia-
rion, conciliation, third-party arbitration or court litigation. While the dispute 
settlement clause of the Vielllla Convenrion on the Protection of the Ozone 
" Interpretations bascd on consensus cntcr thc body of formal law. Set Artide JO of ehe Vienna Convcn-
rion on the Law of Trcaties. Stt also Sehachter, "Thc Nature and Process of Legal Dcvelopmcnt Inrer-
narional Society," in R. MacDonald and D. Johnston, eds., Tht Slruttllrt anJ Proms of Inrmitllionol lAw 
745, at 789-790 (198J). 
„ Thc tcxt of these decisions docs not refor to their legal basis and thcir formal legal status. On the formal 
legal implicarions of such instrumenrs. sce Frowcsn. ··1ntemal and Extemal Effcrn of Resolutions by 
International Organ.iuirions." 49 Z..i;RV 778, and Sehachter, S"f"O notc 92. at 790-792. 
" Stt L..ng, "Luft and Own - Schutzobjekte des Völlt<:rrechis." 46 Z4/IRV 261. at 266 (1986). 
„ h will bc left opcn whcther puticiparing statc aciors arc. in fact, acring "governmcnts" or are bctter 
undersrood as functional adrnirusttanve units of govemments (in this casc, environmental units). for an 
approach considering functional burcaucracics as quasi•autonomow actors in many issuc-arcas, sce R. 
Keohane and J. Nye, A>wn- 4"" lnttr~nct, World Po/irics in TrlUISirion (1977). 
„ This dcvclopmcnt led to the decision by thc Sccond Meeting of thc Parties to the Montreal Protoeol to 
prepare a handbook rcflecting the cntirc nonnarivc sauctUre of thc rcgime. The hmdbook is to contain 
relevant versions of the Protocol and "thc decisions of thc Parties !hat rebte to its interprctation and 
other material relevant to its opcrarion." &t Dccision 11/7, UNElo/Otl..Pro.2/3. 
91 On the individual aspccts of disputes. sce Bilder, "Art Overview of International Dispute Settlement.•• 1 
Emory ). l nt '/ Disputt &solution 1 ( l 9ll6). 
ARTICLES 51 
Layer, which also applies to the Montreal Protocol, offers almost all of these 
options, 96 m:my countries favored compulsory disputc-settlement. 99 There is, 
however, little prospect that states will ever use the third-party dispute settle-
ment option100 because states are generally reluctant to submit disputes to impar-
tial third-party institutions. Thus, for a number of reasons, negotiations remain 
the most important way to settle disputes in the contemporary international legal 
order. 101 
There is another, more principled factor that discourages submission of dis-
putes on ehe interpretation or application of norms that are part of the normative 
structure of dynamic international regimes to third-party adjudication: disputes 
submitted either to the International Court of Justice or to an arbitration com-
rnission have to be settled in accordance with rccognized rules of international 
law. 102 Yet, the body of normative expc:ctations commonly accepted within the 
regime extends weil beyond formally accepted international law. Hence, because 
ehe basis for judicial decision-making is separated, to a cenain extent, from the 
body of normative expectations governing the particular issue-area, third-party 
adjudication could generate new problems. 
In any evc:nt, every dispute about an individual actor's compliance with the 
nonns of a legal system also has a collective aspect because the parties, as a 
group, will primarily be interested in protecring the stability of the legal regime. 
In particular, the group will seek to protect basic normative expectations against 
incidental or unintended modifications threatened by disputes among individual 
parties. Thus, when international envirorunental cooperation is located within a 
sectoral legal system, non-cooperation or non-compliance with normative expec-
tations by an individual actor automatically rises to the level of a dispute between 
that offender and the other parties as a group. 
This "group aspect" calls for a different procedure for dispute settlement. The 
relevant provision of the Montreal Protocol makes abundantly dear that its con-
cern is not disputes between two ( or a small number ot) parties, but rather dis-
putes pitting a single party against the other parties as a group. Thus, the parties 
are requested to "consider and approve procedures and institutional mechanisms 
„ According to Articlc 11. statcs shall ncgotiatc; thcy may rcfcr to third pan mcdiation; they may dcclarc 
thcir acccptancc of arbitnrion or submission of a disputc 10 thc lntcrnanonal Coun of Justicc; and, 
finally. onc of thc partics involvcd is cntitlcd 10 rcqucst thc acarion of a conciliarion commission. whosc 
award has only a rccommcndatory status. 
99 Si:xrccn mosdy Western countrics officially trgTCttcd rhc rcfusal to support compulsory disputc ~ttlc· 
mcnt by onc party. namcly. thc Unitcd Statcs. &t Dcdararion attachcd 10 thc Firnil A.ct. UNEP. Vicnna 
Convcnrion for thc Protcction of thc Ozonc Laycr, Firnil N;t, 1985, at 35. 
100 Su P. Sand. supra norc 69 at 21-22. 
101 Su Bilder, ''lntcrnatiornil Dispute Settlement and rhe Rolc of lntcrnariornil Adjudication." 1 E-ry]. 
Irrt'/ Dil!"'tt /Vsolutiqn t31, at 137 (1987). 
'
02 Arbittation undcr rhe Vicnna Convcruion shall bc "in accordancc with intematiornil law. as weil as thc 
provisions of this Convcnrion md any protocols conccmcd," according ro Articlc 5 of thc Arbitrarion 
Proccdurc, adoptcd at thc First Meeting of thc Puries to thc Con\lcnrion. Su UNEP/OzL.Conv.1/5. 
Annex II. 
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for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol and for 
treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance. " 103 
According to the "non-compliance procedure, "HM adopted on an interim basis 
at the Second Meeting of the Parties, a complaint has to be addressed by one or 
more parties to the Secretariat of the Protocol. Mter giving the alleged off ender 
an opportunity to reply, the Secretariat will transfer the submission to a five-
party Implementation Committee. This committee will then consider the complaint 
and report to the meeting of parties. 105 In following this procedure, conflict 
between individual parties will be avoided from the beginning. The Secretariat, 
an institution jointly established by the parties, will formally submit the complaint 
and the conference of parties, acting in its capacity as the highest decision-making 
body of the regime, will eventually decide on possible acrion.106 Nevertheless, 
the procedure contains an element of compulsion, because it may be triggered 
without the consent of the offending party. 
While disputes submitted to arbitration are to be settled in accordance with 
international law, submissions to the non-compliance procedure are to be 
considered "with a view to securing an amicable resolution of the matter on the 
basis of respect for the provisions of the Protocol. " 107 No reference is made to 
provisions of international law outside the regime's normative structure. On the 
contrary, amicable resolution of the conflicts, and respcct for the provisions of 
the Montreal Protocol, are the sole criteria for findings of the Implementation 
Committee. Tobe sure, this does not imply that the basic rules of international 
law will bc widely disregarded. IUther, it libcrates thc Committce from the limits 
established by formal international law, providcd that the two above-mentioned 
criteria are ful6lled. In short, the Committee will bc able to ignorc certain rules 
of international law whose application might not be considered desirable, 1°8 and 
it may draw upon the body of normative expectations developed within the 
regime regardless of the formal legal status of any particular rule. 
Upon the committee's submission of a report, the conference of parties' decision-
,.., Montreal Ptotocol, Articlc 8. 
1°' Su Dccision IVS. and Annex III. UNE!YOtl..Pto.2/J. The procedurc had bcen prcparcd by a working 
group. Stt rcport UNE!YOtl..Pro.LG.1/3. Originally, it had bccn proposcd to indudc a rcvision of 
Articlc 8 of thc Montreal Ptotocol into the compound Amcndmcnt and to attach thc non-compliancc 
procedurc as an anncx to thc Protocol. st:t 19 EPL 147 (1989). 
'°' This proccdurc extcns1vclly follow. thc dispute-scttlcment mechanism of GATI. cxccpt dut GA.TI 
committccs arc csu.blished for a particular casc and mcmbcn function in a personal capaciry. On thc 
GATI mcchanism, sec Plank. "An Unofficial Dcscription of How a GATI Panel Work.s and Docs 
Not," 4 ]. lnt '/ Arbitrdlion No. 4, 53 ( 1987). 
,„ No agrccmcnt has yet bccn rcached on thc possible conscqucnces of a party's brcach of an obligation. 
00
' Paragnph 6 of thc non-compliancc proccdurc, UNEJYOtl..Pro.2/3, Annex lll. 
1°' For cxamplc, onc might think of thc rulcs on statc rcsponsibiliry and liabiliry for possiblc dam~ rcsult-
ing &om non-complWicc. On this qucsrion, sec Gehring and Jachtenfuchs, "Haftung für 
grcnzübcnchrcit Umwcltichäden: Allcgancinc Regelung des internationalen Umwclihaf-
tungsrcdus." 13 ZUPUR 233 (1990). 
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making relies on similar criteria and "may, taking into consideration the circum-
srances of the case, decide upon and call for steps to bring about full compliance 
with the Protocol ... , and to funher the Protocol's objecrives."109 Again, 
enforcement of the law is not the task of the conference. Instead, the conference 
of the parties sedcs to bring about compliance with the Protocol in light of the 
circwnstances of the case. Instead of sanctions, assistance and support might be 
more appropriate dcpending upon the context. Moreover, the conference is not 
obliged to decide, and it may choose not to respond at all. In short, the confer-
ence remains master of the process and retains all the options as it is not 
restricted to the strict application of formal law. 
In adopting the non-compliance procedure, the conference of parties has 
established an internal quasi-judicial mechanism.110 Disputes may be settled 
within the sectoral system, without reference to insriturions outside the 
regime,111 through urilization of the regime's permanent communicarive process 
and collective appraisal by an audience that has participated in the development 
of the body of norms governing the issue-area. lt may be assumed that future dis-
putes will be settled along the lines of this procedure .112 
Compared to the sophisticated apparatus of the ozone protection regime, the 
regime on long-range transboundary air pollution is far less elaborate. The 
Geneva Convenrion does not contain detailed provisions on dispute settle-
ment. w But let us assume a contracting party to the 502 Protocol does not meet 
its obligarion to reduce emissions by 30% in 1993. In that case, third-party settle-
ment of the conilict involving the applicarion of international law proper is 
unlikely to occur. The offending country will not risk being found in violation of 
international law or being held liable for damages. 
The group of parties making up the Executive Body will, however, have to 
address the issue in one way or another. A conflict between individual countries 
is, therefore, almost automarically converted into a situation in which the 
offender faces the entire community of parties. Similar to the dispute settlement 
process within the framework of the Montreal Protocol, the Executive Body may 
not feel obliged to apply international law strictly. lt might instead choose from a 
•
09 Paragraph 7 of thc non-compliancc proccdurc, UNEWOzL.Pro.2/3/Anncx III. 
''
0 Sincc dccision-malcing will be madc with thc gcncral purposc of stabifuing 1hc rulcs of 1he rcgimc 
against unin1cndcd changc. i1 will havc 10 procccd gcnerally according 10 thcsc rules; it must, therefore, 
bc considcrcd legal, u opposcd 10 political. decision-making. On the difference, ..,e Higgins, "Policy 
Considcrations and rhe ln1cnu.tional Judicial Proccss," 17 ICLQ 58 (1968). 
'
11 In dcciding complaints, rhc conferencc of partics will also dischargc thc law-dcclaring function for 1he 
sectoral legal system which othcrwisc 1s entrusted to couns. Su Bilder, rupra note 101 a 1 150; and 
Meyer, '"Thc Ad Hoc Chambers: Pcrspcctivcs of the Parties and thc Court," 27 AVR 413, at 436-437 
(1989). 
"' Note that rhe non-compliance procedure fonnally applics only to obligarions containcd in the Montreal 
Protocol. Theoretically. rhe proccdurc containcd in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention also remains 
applicablc. 
iu Article 13 refcrs only IO negotiations u a means of dispute settlemen1. 
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range of responses that fall short of the application of formal law. 11• In short, any 
norm of the sectoral system, regardless of its formal legal status, might come into 
play. As is the case with the Montreal Protocol, the Executive Body will remain 
master of this dispute settlement process. Thus, dcspite the differences in the 
development of institutionalized proccdures, non-compliance cases can bc 
expected to be handled very similarly in both regimes: the communicative 
processes of international environmental regimes internalize the judicial func-
tion. The regimcs provide for intcmal dispute settlement mcchanisms that may 
or may not be formalized, 11 5 but which, on all accounts, must be considered 
highly satisfactory. 
The conference of parties is undoubtedly the most appropriate forum to 
decide disputes involving claims seeking to modify the normative structure of a 
sectoral legal system. Not only will the conference of parties seek to shape con-
sensus on the conilict issue, but once consensus has emerged, it tends to modify 
or confirm authoritatively, as the case may be, the normative structure of the 
regime. Further, the conference of parties may be in a better position to settle 
disputes about the interpretation and application of law. While third-party insti-
tutions will have to base their decision upon formal legal principles, 116 the parties 
as a group will decidc by shaping consensus on the interpretation of norms in 
light of the faetual circumstances. Such a consensus interpretation may imply a 
change in normative expectations. Even so, it will reinforce the stability of the 
sectoral legal system as a whole. 117 
IV. CONCLUSION 
International environmental regimes constitute a particular type of instirution, 
distinct from both multilateral treaties and international organizations. Likc 
treaties, they comprise a specific normative framework of prescriptions that are 
particularly suitable to organizing intemarionally coordinated behavior within a 
'" The Execurive Body might grant thc ofTcnding country a grace pcriod. possibly evcn offering acrive 
support for a rapid implementarion of the obligarion. lt might choosc to accept. or only to take note of, 
the reasons given by the offending country; or it might simply ignore thc offensc. Any of thcsc 
strategies would be consistent with stabilizing the rule subsequent to an incidcnt of non--compliance. Stt 
Luhmann. svpra note 60 at 53-64. on the stabiliution of nonns against unintcndcd change. 
"' An international regime considered as a communicarivc system in which "law" is administercd has cer-
tain similarities with •• autopoieric" legal systems. On the applicarion of systenis theory to domestic legal 
systems, see G. Teubner. cd .. A11topoinic l.4w: A Ntw Appr-1r w Liw anJ &Mty (1988). parricularly. 
Luhmann. '"Ihe Unity of the Legal System." at 12. S« also G. Teubncr, &cht als ""tqpoidiscMs Sysum 
(1989). 
11
• Stt Bilder. svpra note 101 at 158-159. not:ing that adjudicarion (i.t .• thc decision of cases according to 
exisring law) is usually conservarive. 
"' &t Schachrer's remark. SMf'd note 92 at 782: "lt nuy be noted thar the treaty-regimes, takcn u a group, 
are characterized by a relarively high degree of compliance. This is atttibutablc in pan to the fact that 
thc:y provide for insriturional decisions by a represenurive organ or an cxecurivc body. Such institu-
rioiW decisions tend ro limir rhe sphere of auto-inrerpreunon by thc sutcs of their obligations." 
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limited issue-area. Like international organizations, they provide a permanent 
mechanism for changing these normative prescriptions. 
International environmental regimes contribute to shaping consensus among 
actors regarding their common assessment of technical knowledge concerning 
not only the necessity of, but also the capacity for, internationally coordinated 
action. Consequently, a commonly elaborated and widely accepted body of tech-
nical knowledge relevant to the adoption of normative prescriptions gradually 
emerges. Actors develop common cognitive expectations of what action is neces-
sary and what action is possible within the issuc-area at a givcn time. These 
expectations are subject to constant modification in light of scientific and tech-
nological changc. While this adaptation is essential and desirable in order eo 
organize international co-operarion effectively within ehe international regime, it 
leads to frequent changes of prescriptions. 
Moreover, the regularly scheduled meetings of international environmental 
regimes provide a forum for continuous discussion and negotiation. At any time, 
new initiatives concerning legal prescriptions may be tabled. At any time, the 
existing legal structure may be challenged. Participating govemrnents are regu-
larly confronted with pending projects. The periodic reconvening of ehe confer-
ence of parties facilitates step-by-step approaches; since compromises may be 
reconsidered and adopted, insttuments may envisage future "second steps." The 
normative structure of an international regime tends, therefore, to be subject to 
frequent revision even without changes in technical knowledge. However, the 
two aspects - the permanent development of technical knowledge and the fre-
quent changes in normative prescriptions - are mutually reinforcing: ehe pace of 
legal change accelerates. 
As a consequence, formal legal instruments do not at any time entirely reflect 
the body of commonly agreed-upon normative expectations. While it is impor-
tant to remember that international environrnental regimes of the type discussed 
here are not based on "soft law,"118 even some of their important norms possess 
less than formal legal status. Within the sectoral legal system that the inter-
national regime represents, norms are not, however, distinguished in terms of 
their formal legal status. Rather, both categories of norms, because they are 
based on consensus, or (in rare cases) on near-consensus, are considered as entail-
ing the same legally significant expectarions. 
This pragmatism is reinforced by the fact that the judicial function (i.e., the 
interpretation of general norms in light of a specific context, the settlement of 
disputes and response to non-compliance) is not discharged by institutions 
located outsdie the regime's structure. For a number of reasons, international 
regimes tend to internalizc the judicial function either according to formalized 
procedures or consistent with the general consensus-shaping process of the 
regime. Internalization of the judicial function involves a transformation of dis-
111 On soft cnvironmcntal law, as dcvclopcd in thc framcwork of UNEP or OECD. sec Lang, "Die 
Verrechdichung des internationalen Umwdtschut:zcs," 22 AVR 283 (1984) and P. Sand, "'P"a notc 69 at 
16-17. 
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putes, located at the individual level, into incidents of non-compliance with the 
commonly agreed-upon body of normative expectations located at the collective 
level. This intemalization of the judicial fwiction is a natural consequencc of thc 
conscnsus-shaping discussion process within regimes. 
In sum, international environmental regimes go far bcyond treaty law as such. 
For a defined issue-area, thcy are international institutions comprising both an 
accepted body of normative prcscriptions and an organized process for the mak-
ing and applicarion of these prescriprions. Given the successful integration of 
these two elemcnts, international regimes turn out to be comparatively autono-
mous sectoral legal systems. 
